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STABTOP tI. PACIFIC ELECTRIC

By. Co.

[29 C.2d

(L. A.. No. 19876. In Bank. Apr. 28, 1947.]

SADIE STARTUP et aI., Appellants, v. PACIFIC
ELECTRIC RAILWAY COMPANY (a Corporation),
Respondent.

Pl

Bailroad&-lDjuries from Operation-Warnings and Sipala.All interurban railroad company which bas undertaken to
WarD travelers of its trains by the nse of a wigwag must use
reasonable eare in the construction and maintenance of the
signal system lest the appearance of 811.fety created by the.
presence of the device constitute a trap for persons relying on
it for protection.
[2] 1d. -lDjuries from Operation - Instructions - Signals and
Warnings.-In an action against an interurban railroad company for injuries sustained by automobile guests in a grade
crossing collision. it was error to ,"ve an instruction that there
wa!'! no evidence on which to mpport a ftndin~ that defendant
was negligent in respect to the installation, operation or
maintenance of the wigwag signals installed at the erossiug
where, in view of plaintiffs' evidence of violation of defendants' rule as to distance between trains, it could not be said as a
matter of law that defendant was free from negligence in the
operation or installation of a signaling system which depended
on compliance with the rule to pn!Vent it from opeTatin2' as a
trap.
[8] 1d. -lDjuries from Operation-Oare b7 Bailroad-Warninp
and Signals. - In an action against an interurban railroad
company for injuries sustained by automobile ~ests in a
grade, Grossing collision, it eould not be said as a matter of
law that the eompany was uot negligent in the installation of
a signaling system which depended on compliance with a rule
as to distance between trains to prevent it from operating
as a trap, where it appeared that the placement of cutin and
eutout switches eould bave been adjusted so as to give WarDing of the approach of all trains
[4&,4b] Id.-lDJuries from Operation-Oontributol'7 Negligence.In an action against an interurban railroad company for injuries Bustained by automobile guests at night in a grade crossing collision. it was error to instruet the jury that the driver

[1] Bee 22 Oal.Jm. 307; 44 Am.Jm. 692.
Melt. Dig. References: [1] Railroads, § 71(1); [2] Railroads,
§ 122(5); [3] Railroads, 171(1); [4] Railroads, 1122(9); [6, 8]
Railroads, 1109(1)•
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of the automobile in which plaintiffs were riding was guilty
of negligence 8S a matter of law where there was evidence
that he took some precautions before crossing thl' tracks:
that he had stopped 8t the crossin!! in responsE' to t~1' warning !riven by a wi~ag si~!I) Rnd waitei! while two trains passei!
ani! until thE' wig-wR.e eeasl'i! operatin~: and that hI' ~tartei!
across thE' track!" without again looking only when. in reliance
on the cessation of thE' wigwag. it 8'PPl'arei! to him that he
could do so with safety.
[5) ld. - Injuries from Operation-Oontributory Negligence-Rellance on Safety Devices.-A railroad may not encouragE' persons traveling on highways to rely on safety devices and tben
bold them to the same de~e of care 8S if thE' devices wl're
not present.
[61 ld. - Injuries from Operation-Contributory Negligence-Reliance on Safety Devices. - An 8utomobile driver must take
some precaution for his safety when attempting to mooss railroad tracks, even though the railroad has installed some !Y81em
to warn of approaching trains.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Reversed.

Los Angele.c; County. Frank G. Swain. Judge.

Action for damages for injuries arising out of a collision of
an automobile and a train. Judgment for defendant reversed.
Samuel P. Young and Paul Blackwood for Appellants.
Frank Karr, C. W. Cornell and O. O. Collins for Respondent.
GIBSON, C. J.-Plaintiffs were guests in an automobile
which was struck by an interurban train operated by defendant. They have appeaJed from a judgment rendered
after a verdict in favor of defendant claiming that the
jury was erroneously instructed on the law applicable to
their theory of the case.
The collision ocmIrred at approximately 12:45 a. m. at
an intersection of defendant's private right-of-way with a
six-lane highway on which there was heavy trafflc both day
and night. There were four sets of tracks on the right-of-way;
tracks one and two on the west carried southbound trains,
and tracks three and four on the east were used for northbound trains. The automobile was proceeding east on the
highway and after it erossed tracks one and two, it was
struck by a three-car northbound train on track three.
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The defendant maintained a warning system with wigwags at the southwest and northeast cornel'A of the intersection. The switcheR which operated the wigwags were placed
nt varying distanceR from the hiJP:hway crossing and the PaRsage of a train on anyone of the foul' !'letA of trackR woulil
!rta.rt and mop the warning device. On track three wherf'
the accident occurred. the last cutin switch waR 576 feet !IIOuth
of the center of the intel'Aection and the cutout switch wa!'
39 feet north. with the reault that if one train W8fI followinl!
another on track three within 600 feet. the wigwaJP: would'
mop operating aR the ftnrt of the two trainR p8.!!Sed the
cutout switch. and would not again function while the following train. havinJP: already paRRM the cmtin RWit.ch. approached the highway.
The evidence iR sharply conflicting as to what occurred
immediately prior to and at the time of the accident. Plaintiif!':' evidenee waR aR follows: The wigwap: WaR operatinJ!
a..~ the automobile approached the intersection and the driver
stopped at the c1'OR!!ing to let a !IIOuthbound freight train
paSl'! on track one AR the freight train cleared the Cl'()8.<lin/! and while the automobile remaine<1 !rta.nding, a single
internrban cal' passed on one of the three trackR farthest
from the automobile The witnesReI'I did not agree aR to the
track on whit'h the Ringle cal' waR tra.veling. The driver of
the automobile te.~ified on direct examination that he believed the car WaR on track three. but that it could have
been on track two. On cross-examination he testified that
the ear WIUl traveling on track three or four. Plaintiff
Startup placed the Ringle ear on track four. and one of the
other plaintiffll testified that it WaR on track three 01' four
The wigwag cea.~ed to operate when the single ear cleared
the intersection. and the driver of the automobile, without
again looking north or !'lOuth, started across the tracks.
When the automobile reached track three, it was struck by
a northbound three-ear train which followed the single ear.
The train which collided with the automobile sounded no
warning and the wigwag was not working as the train approached the intersection nor was it operating after the eollision although the train had not passed the cutout switch.
Defendant's evidence WIUl that the automobile did not
stop, that neither a freight train nor a single car passed the
crossing near the time of the accident. that the wigwag operated at all times and that the train which collided with the
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automobile sounded appropriate warning signals as it approached the intersection.
It is clear that there was su1Bcient evidence to support
a verdict for defendant, but plainti1fs eontend that the
evidence presented material questions of fact with regard
to the inRtallation, operation and maintenance of the signal system, and that the eourt el'1'Oneously took theRe
qllestionll from the jury by the following instruction:
"In this ease there is no evidence upon which to support
a finding that the defendant was nt'.gligent in respect to
the imrtallation, operation or maintenance of the wigwag
aignalll installed at the crossing. You are therefore instructed that lUI to the iRSUe of whethel' defendant was negligent in respect to the wigwags, you muRt' find that the
defendant WIUI not negligent. even though you may believe
from the evidence that the wigwa~ Rt.opped opeTatin!! af'ter
the freight train passed the crossinjr. ,.
[1] The defendant. having undertaken to warn travelerK
of the approach of' itA train.c; by the use of a wigwag, was
under a duty to use reasonable care in the construction and
maintenance of the signa) system lest the appearance of safety
created by the presence of the device constitute a trap for
persons relying upon it for protection. (W...1l v. Southern.
PGCific Co., 18 Cal.2d 468. 473-474 rU6 P.2d 44]; Erie R.
Co. v. Sf6'WtJrf,4O F.2d 855, 857; Mallett v. Southern. PtlCific
Co., 20 Ca1.App.2d 500. 506 [68 P.2d 281).)
[J] The uncontradicted evidence establishes that the signaling system was 80 con.c;tructed that when one train followed another on track three within 600 feet the wigwag
would cease to operate when the first train cleared the crossing, thereby indicating that traftic could cross the tracks in
safety, notwithstanding the existence of imminent danger
. from the following train. Plainti1fs' evidence was that these
were the circumstances under which the system was operating
.at the time of the accident. There was evidence that the wigwag was not working as the three-ear train approached the
intersection on track three, and that the single car which
passed the intersection shortly ahead of the three-ear train
was also traveling on track three. It could be inferred that
the wigwag stopped because the three-ear train was following
the single car on the same track and within the distance in
which the wigwag would not operate. The defendant, however, asserts that the operating rules of the company provide
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that one train shall not follow another at a distance of less
than 2,500 feet, and that, if the train which struck the automobile was following so closely that the wigwag failed to give
warning of its approach, this was the fault of the motorman
and not of the signaling device. It is argued that the negligence of the company, if any, resulted from the failure of its
employees to abide by the rules of the company, and that the
instruction was therefore correct in stating that the defendant was not negligent in respect to the installation, maintenance or operation of the wigwag signals. This contention
assumes that one of the purposes of the rule was to prevent
the signaling device from operating as a trap. It follows
from this assumption that compliance with the rule was an
essential part of the operation of the system as a whole and,
since it appears from plaintiffs' evidence that the rule was violated, it cannot be said as a matter of law that defendant was
free from negligence in the operation of the signaling system. ,
[3] Nor can we say as a matter of law that the company
was not negligent in the installation of a signaling system
which depended upon compliance with such a rule to prevent
it from operating as a trap. It appears that the placement
of the cutin and cutout switches could have been adjusted
so as to give warning of the approach of all trains, and
this is a factor which the jury was entitled to consider
in determining woother the company, having assumed the
duty of warning travelers on the highway of the dangerous
proximity of trains, used reasonable care in the installation
and operation of its signaling system.
[4&] Plaintiffs contend that the court also erred in
giving the following instruction:
"The driver of tile auto in which plaintiffs were riding
testified that he starteli to cross defendants' tracks without
looking for approaching trains, but relied wholly on the wigwag. You are instructed that the driver of the automobile
was guilty of negligence as a matter of law, and if you :find
that such negligence on his part was the sole proximate cause
of the accident, then your verdict must be for defendant."
As we have seen, the accident happened in the night time
at an intersection which carried heavy traffic both day and
night. The driver of the car stopped at the crossing in response to the warning given by the wigwag and waited while
two trains passed and until the wigwag ceased operating. He
started across the tracks without again looking only when,
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wigwag, it appeared to
him that he could do 80 in safety.
[5] It is settled that a railroad may not encourage persons traveling on highways to rely on safety devices and
then hold them to the same degree of care as if the devices
were not present. (Wm v. Southern Pacific Co., 18 Ca1.2d
468, 474 [116 P.2d 44]; Toschi v. Christian, 24 Cal.2d 354,
360 [149 2d 848]; Koch v. Southern California By. Co., 148
Cal. 677, 680 [84 P. 176, 113 Am.St.Rep. 332. 7 Ann.Cas.
795, 4 L.R.A.N.S. 521].) [6] The railroad tracks are, of
course, themselves a warning of danger and a driver of an
automobile must take some precautions for his safety when
attempting to cross them, even though the railroad has installed 80me system to warn of approaching trains. (Will v.
Southern Pacific Co., supra; Toschi v. Christian, supra, at
p. 360, et seq.) It is ordinarily a question for the jury whether
the precautions taken by the driver of ihe automobi1e are
sufficient in view of a11 of the circumstances. (Toschi v.
Christian, supra, at p. 360; Koch v. Southern California Ry.
Co., supra, at p. 680; WI'll v. Southern Pacific Co., supra, at
p. 475.) And it has been held that even where the crossing
is unguarded and the driver failed to look that "In determining the degree of care which should be expected from a
reasonably cautious person in crossing the railroad track . . .
the jury might consider the fact that a freight train had just
passed and that one would not ordinarily expect another train
80 soon." (Pietrofitta v. Southern Pac. Co., 107 Cal.App.
575. 580 [290 P. 597]. See, also, Lindsey v. Pacific Eke. By.
Co., 111 Cal.App. 482, 488, et seq. [296 P. 131].)
[4b] There was evidence that the driver of the automobile in which plaintiffs were riding took some precautions
before crossing the tracks, and "where it is shown that a
[driver] has exercised some care, the question whether or not
the care actually exercised was due and sufficient will always
be a matter for determination by the jury." (Koch v. Southern California By. Co., 148 Cal. 677, 680 [84 P. 176, 113 Am.
St.Rep. 332, 7 Ann.Cas. 795, 4 L.R.A.N.S. 521].) It was
therefore error for the court to instruct the jury that the
driver of the automobile was guilty of negligence as a
matter of law.
The judgment is reversed.

Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Carter, J., Schauer, J., and Spence,
J., eoneurred.
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TRAYNOR, J .-1 concur in the judgment.
1 agree with the main opinion regarding the instruction
concerning the installation, operation, and maintenance of
the wigwag signals. I cannot agree, however, as to the negligence of the driver of the automobile. The driver stopped
at the crossing in response to the warning given by the wigwag and waited until two trains passed and the wigwag ceased
operating. The crucial question is whether it was negligence
thereafter to cross the tracks without looking for approaching trains. A jury is in no better position than this court
to answer this question. There is every reason why this issue,
often raised in practice, should be settled by this court and
not left to the oscillating verdicts of juries. (See Holmes,
The Common Law, 123.) The court therefore should determine the standard of reasonable conduct for deciding whether
or not the conduct in question was negligent. (See concurring
opinion in Toschi v. Christian, 24 Cal.2d 354, 364 [149 P.2d
848]; concurring opinion in Satterlee v. Orange Glenn School
District, ante, pp. 581, 593 [177 P.2d 279].) In my opinion
the invitation to cross implicit in the cessation of the wigwag
and the absence of other factors that might serve to warn
of danger relieved the driver of the duty to look for approaching trains. Be therefore complied with the requirements of due care when he stopped and waited for the cessation of the wigwag before proceeding to cross the tracks.
Such a driver is in a di1ferent position from a driver who finds
the wigwag silent or in a stationary condition when he approaches the tracks and crosses them without lookblg for
approaching trains. The former is assured by the operation
of the wigwag that it is functioning and will warn of approaching trains, whereas the latter. having no such assurance, must anticipate the possibility that the wigwag is not
functioning. (See Will v. South8rn Pacific Co., 18 Cal.2d
468, 474-475 L116 P.2d 44]; 53 A.L.R. 975; 99 A.L.R. 732.)
Moreover, the instruction with respect to the driver's negligence was unnecessary and misleading. The plaintiffs were
the guests of the driver and his negligence was not imputable to them. (Campagna v. Market St. By. Co., 24 Cal.
2d 304, 309 [149 P.2d 281]; Pope v. HaZpern, 193 Cal. 168.
174 [223 P. 470 J; Bf'f/ant v. Pacific Eke. By. Co., 174 Cal.
737 [164 P. 385]; see Restatement, Torts, § 490.) "The ultimate question for the determination of the jury was whether
defendants were guilty of negligence contributinB to plain-

I

Apr. 1947 j .DI:i>T. 01' Soaw. WIU'.AItII t1. KDN Oovaftrr
. . ColI . . . _

.... IJ

873

tUrs' injuries. The conduct of the driver of the automobile,
not being in issue, was admissible in evidence only to the
extent that it might aid in the determination of the ques.
tion of the negligence of defendants." (Krupp v. Lo. Aft.
geZu By. Corp., 57 Cal.App.2d 695, 698 [135 P.2d 424].) The
vice of such an instruction is that it tends to lead the jury
to believe that their verdict depends on the negligence of
the driver. (See Krupp v. Lo, Aftgelu By. Corp., "'1'''(1;
BeftOwdeft v. PGCift,c Electric By. Co., 73 Cal.App. 383, 387
[238 P. 785]; Luftd v. PGCift,c Electric BJ/. Co., 25 Cal.2d 287,
293-294 [153 P.2d 7051.)

Respondent's petition for
26, 1947•
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